As the United States approaches another pivotal election season, several state officials have expressed growing unease about the capacity and reliability of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), particularly in light of diminished staffing and lingering distrust rooted in policies from the Trump administration. While DHS remains a key federal agency tasked with assisting states in safeguarding elections from both domestic and foreign threats, its perceived credibility and operational strength have come under scrutiny.
In recent months, a number of state election leaders have voiced apprehension about relying on DHS’s cybersecurity and infrastructure security divisions, citing concerns that stem from both institutional shifts during the previous administration and ongoing resource limitations. Their worries highlight a broader issue in America’s decentralized electoral system: how state and federal agencies collaborate to protect one of democracy’s most essential functions.
During the time when Donald Trump was President, there were often disputes between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and state election officials. Although the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established in 2018 as a part of DHS to help safeguard essential infrastructures like election systems, Trump’s comments about the validity of elections often opposed CISA’s public declarations.
Following the 2020 election, representatives from CISA declared that the election process was secure and that there was no indication of significant fraud. This statement directly opposed Trump’s allegations of election wrongdoing, resulting in the termination of CISA Director Christopher Krebs. His removal surprised many in the cybersecurity community and public officials. This event signified a shift in how certain state authorities viewed the impartiality and dependability of DHS.
Currently, despite the change in leadership, the agency continues to deal with ongoing doubts, particularly from individuals who feel that political influence might have affected its autonomy. Consequently, some states remain cautious about completely trusting DHS for assistance related to elections, even as cyber threats to voter data, election systems, and public confidence increase.
Adding to the problem of trust is a decrease in personnel in essential departments within DHS that give cybersecurity support to state and local governments. Based on internal reviews and public reports, numerous cybersecurity positions are unfilled, hindering the agency’s capacity to provide prompt assistance or allocate resources during important election times.
For example, election officials in several states report delays in receiving DHS vulnerability assessments or intelligence briefings. These services—once seen as essential tools in preparing for cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns—have become harder to access due to limited personnel and strained coordination between federal and state actors.
In certain situations, states have looked to private cybersecurity companies or set up standalone teams to address what is seen as a lack of federal assistance. Although these actions can offer important safeguards, they might also result in uneven standards and disjointed security practices across different areas.
As a reaction to their worries, state election authorities have aimed to enhance their internal cybersecurity skills and establish collaborations with reliable federal or non-governmental organizations. A number of states have grown their election security departments, employed specialized information security personnel, and boosted spending on employee education and technological improvements.
Additionally, some secretaries of state have pursued collaboration with the National Guard’s cybersecurity units or academic institutions with expertise in election integrity. These alternatives allow states to retain greater control over their systems while still benefiting from external expertise.
Despite this pivot, many states acknowledge that DHS still holds valuable resources, particularly in threat intelligence, vulnerability scanning, and coordination with intelligence agencies. The challenge lies in rebuilding the kind of collaborative relationship that can make these tools both effective and trusted.
Since the shift to the Biden administration, CISA has been actively working to re-establish its reputation as an impartial guardian of electoral security. With new management in place, the organization has initiated programs to reassure state authorities of its dedication to openness and impartiality. These efforts incorporate frequent threat updates, open-to-public online seminars, and local security conferences designed to address the specific needs of regional election officials.
CISA has also emphasized the importance of its role as a “trusted partner,” offering free services such as risk assessments, intrusion detection tools, and best practices guides for election infrastructure protection. However, the lingering impact of prior controversies continues to affect how some states perceive and utilize these offerings.
To address these challenges, the agency is working to expand its staffing pipeline and improve interagency coordination, but rebuilding trust remains a long-term project. Election security officials note that consistency, clear communication, and political independence will be key to strengthening these partnerships moving forward.
As election-related cyber threats continue to evolve, the importance of cohesive federal-state collaboration becomes even more critical. State systems remain frequent targets of ransomware attacks, phishing campaigns, and influence operations originating from abroad. Without unified defense strategies and shared information channels, the nation’s electoral integrity may become increasingly vulnerable.
Experts warn that fragmentation in the security landscape—where each state acts independently with little coordination—can create weak points that adversaries exploit. DHS, with its broad mandate and access to federal intelligence, remains a uniquely positioned agency to support a unified response.
However, this potential can only be achieved if state authorities have confidence in the agency’s intentions, skills, and professionalism. As one election official stated, “We can’t afford distrust when the stakes are so high—though we must be careful about whom we choose to trust.”
With the 2024 general election on the horizon, state and local election officials are working to finalize their cybersecurity strategies and logistical preparations. Whether DHS will play a central role in those plans remains an open question for several states, especially those still grappling with concerns over staffing and past political interference.
Some lawmakers have called for additional funding to bolster both DHS and state election offices, recognizing that robust defense requires investment at all levels. Others advocate for legislative reforms to clarify the agency’s responsibilities and insulate its leadership from political pressure.
At the same time, CISA keeps collaborating with stakeholders, fine-tuning its communication strategies, and enhancing its assistance offerings to recover trust across all 50 states. The real challenge will be determining if these efforts lead to successful, reliable partnerships once the forthcoming major election period commences.
The legacy of past controversies and ongoing resource constraints have left some states questioning the reliability of the Department of Homeland Security’s role in election protection. While the agency remains a critical asset in the broader cybersecurity landscape, its ability to regain full trust from state officials depends on transparency, staffing improvements, and a demonstrated commitment to nonpartisan support.
As elections grow more complex and digital threats more sophisticated, ensuring that every level of government can work together securely is essential. Without it, the vulnerabilities aren’t just technological—they’re institutional, and they strike at the very foundation of democratic participation.
